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Summary findings
Recent theory posits  that accountability  in public  service  performance  and accountability.  Little research  has been
can be enhanced  by the use of "exit'  and "voice"  done on whether voice mechanisms  make service
mechanisms.  providers  more accountable.
With exit mechanisms,  users  of public services  can  Paul addresses  that issue by investigating  whether
choose alternative sources  of supply. Exit mechanisms  providers  of irrigation services  in Indonesia  were more
are viable  when there is competition.  They are not viable  accountable  when the public  used voice  mechanisms.  He
for essential  services  for which government  is the sole  asked  these questions:  Did the use of voice improve
provider.  public  accountability  in irrigation  services?  If
Voice mechanisms  are the more likely option when the  accountability  improved,  did service outcomes  also
service provider is a monopoly.  With voice mechanisms  improve?  He focused  on how voice  works and the
-for  example, public  meetings,  local representation on  mechanisms  through which it influences  accountabiliry.
public committees,  or collective  action by user groups - He found that water user associations  did make
the public seeks  better performance  from public service  providers of irrigation services  more accountable  and
providers without opting for alternative sources of  that crop intensity  increased  as a result
supply.
Considerable  research  has been done on how and
whether exit mechanisms  improve  organizations'
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There is growing international  concern  today about the erosion of public
accountability  in developing  countries.  While-the  market can deliver some of the functions and
services being provided by governments  at different  levels,  there is general agreement  among
experts that many essential functions,  both developmental  and regulatory,  will continue  to be the
responsibility  of governments  and that their effective  and efficient performance  will require
increased attention  to the issue of public accountability.  Studies in different  parts of themworld
have attributed  successful  publc service outcomes  to the presence  of strong accountabiity
systems and have documented  the association  of unsatisfactory  outcomes  with weak public
accountability  (Kanter  and Summers 86; Herzlinger  79; Paul 82; Hartmark  75). The growing
evidence on this problem worldwide  is a major reason why public accountability  has emerged as
a central issue in the govemance  of developing  countries  (World  Bank 92). Many observers  share
the view that new approaches to accountability  need to be developed  and used by countries  if the
efficiency and effectiveness  of their public services  are to be enhanced.
This monograph  reports the findings  of a study that investigated  whether  public
service providers perform  better when their accountability  is enhanced  through  the public's use of
"voice". The public service  selected for study was irrigation  and the field research on this sector
was done in Indonesia.  Irigation is a service for which substantial  resources have been allocated
in many developing  countries and one whose performance  has been a source of much public
concern.  The monograph  concludes  with a discussion  of the policy implications  of the findings  of
the study.In this study, we have postulated  that the public would  use voice to elicit a more
responsive  behavior from service providers.  The production  of service outcomes  is largely within
the purview of service providers.  The public's way of influencing  outcomes  is an indirect one. It
may seek greater accountability  from providers through  complaints,  organized protests  or
participation in decision making,  all of which are manifestations  of voice. If these interventions
lead to a behavior  modification  in providers,  their public accountability  (reflected  in increased
responsiveness  and compliance)  is enhanced. Enhanced  accountability  is then postulated  to
improve service outcomes.  When service providers  are more responsive  to the public, they tend
to take actions that produce outcomes valued  by the public. This is accountability's  unique
contribution,  though admittedly,  other variables  also influence  service outcomes'.
Recent theoretical  work posits that public service accountability  can be enhanced
through  the  use of "exit t' and "voice" mechanisms.  (Paul 91). Exit implies that the public (users
of a public service) has access to alternative  sources of supply. Voice refers to the phenomenon
of the public seeking  better performance  from service providers  without opting for alternative
sources of supply. Voice is likely to be the more efficient option  for the public when the service
provider is a monopoly. This is because multiple sources of supply are ruled out or are too costly
under monopoly. Exit is not a viable option under the circumstances.
It is surprising  that "voice"  remains an under-researched  area. We know much
more about the role and impact of exit or competition  in society. Studies within and across
countries have dorumented how exit works and under  what conditions.  On the other hand, the
role, functions  and impact  of voice which has considerable  relevance to the working of the public
sector remain poorly understood.  Instead of prescribing  exit options where they cannot work,
more attention  needs to be given to leaming about voice and to see whether voice can be made to
work for the public. The present  study is a modest step in this directon.
When and how does voice improve public accountability?  An understanding  of
the relationships  between voice and public accountability and between accountability  and
service outcomes  is central  to this question.  Before the nature of these relationships  can be
discussed, it is necessary  to explain the terms, voice, public accountability  and service outcomes.
Voice has been briefly defined above. It refers to a range of mechanisms  the public can use to
exert pressure on service providers to influence  their behavior  so as to generate  better service
outcomes. User groups that engage in collective  action are a well known voice mechanism.  Such
groups may or may not have a participatory  role in decision making pertaining  to services. Users
who pay a service fee may exert voice differently  from those who don't User groups or
organizations  may also vary in the support they receive  from extemal agents  who tend to
strengthen their voice. A full understanding  of the impact of voice will require a study of cases
that adequately  reflect all these different  features.  The limited  scope of this exploratory  study did
'For exanmple,  public  policies  determine  the funds, technology  and human  resources  available  to a service
provider.  The characteristics  of the public  (income  and educational  levels, heterogeneity,  etc.) also affect outcomes.4
not permit the analysis  of the separate  effects of the different voice mechanisms. Instead,  we
have examined  the impact  of selected  variants of voice on public accountability  and service
outcomes  through a comparative  analysis of cases with and without  the use of voice.  These cases
were comparable  in all other significant  respects.
Public accountability  mechanisms  and practices are meant to influence  the
behavior  of service  providers so that they generate outcomes  valued  by the public. Accountability
implies responsiveness  to the public and adherence  to certain norms  of conduct by the provider
within the constraints  of public  policy. For example, when the number of complaints declines
and the public is more satisfied (relative to expectations)  with the resolution  of complaints  by the
provider, responsiveness  can be said to have improved.  The public's  access to information  on
key provider decisions  and plans.  (on investment,  delivery, etc) is an indication  of compliance
(adherence  to norms of conduct).
Service outcomes  refer to the dimensions  of the providers performance  that the
pUbiic  or users wish to see reflected  in the services they receive 2. Broadly spealing, improved
accountability  through the use of voice can be expected to generate positive  outcomes in terms of
efficiency and equity  for the public.  In irrigation,  timely and reliable delivery  of water to the
farmer is generally  regarded as a measure of efficiency.  When water is distributed  fairly among
farmers (improved access),  the outcome  can be considered  equitable.  When a service  provider is
operating well within the production  possibility frontier,  for example,  there will be scope for him
to move up in terms of both efficiency and equity. Voice, through  its influence  on public
accountability,  may also induce  the service  provider  to move the production  possibility frontier
outwards. This, of course, implies the adoption  or creation of technological  innovations.
A major part of the present  study is devoted to an analysis of the relationships
among  voice, accountability  and service outcomes  using evidence from the irrigation  sector in
Indonesia.  While many aspects  of the voice-accountability-outcome  relationship  deserve careful
study, we have focussed  on the following  two issues: First, does voice cause public
accountability  to improve? Second,  is improved  accountability  followed  by more satisfactory
service outcomes?  The design of the study deliberately  sacrificed  the generalizability  of the
findings  across sectors and countries  in favor of a more in depth understanding  of and the lessons
to be learned from the voice-accountability-outcome  relationship  found in one public service in a
single country.
2 lhe  terms service  outcomes  and performance  will  be  used interchangeably  in this  paper.5
Chapter 2
The Research  Problem and Methodology
Conventional,  wisdom has focused  on "hierarchical  control" (HC) as the key to the
process of public accountability. HC involves the supervision  and control of service providers
through  an upward chain of command  that links the supervising  bureaucrats  to the minister and
to the elected legislature,  or the supreme ruler in a non-democratic  setting? The traditional  view-
is that accountability  leads to satisfactory  service outcomes  through a reporting and review
process that is controlled by those in authority  over service providers  who are their agents. 4
Responsiveness  to the public and adherence  to accepted  norms of conduct by these agents (key
elements of accountability)  are presumed  to be monitored  and kept on track by those in authority
(supervisors,  auditors, etc.). Thus political  leaders and supervising  bureaucrats act as proxies for
the public and hold the service providers reporting to them accountable  through  monitoring and
control systems within the relevant organizations  (Jabbra and Dwivedi 89). The dominant pattem
has therefore been one of vertical or "upward"  accountability  and not of "outward"  accountability
or responsiveness  to the public. 5 The extension  of this approach  to public services in general has
been reported to have led to a relative neglect of service outcomes  in the monitoring system and
to the dominance  of some categories  of stakeholders  at the expense  of others, especially the vast
majority of the public (Kanter and Summers 1986;  Smookler 1989;  Birdsall and James 1990).
The bureaucracy,  politicians and other elites have been known to have subverted  HC to meet
their own ends. -Under  these conditions,  HC by itself seems incapable of ensuring genuine
responsiveness  to the public or satisfactory  service outcomes.
When HC fails to create proper public accountability,  the public stands to gain
from the use of exit and voice as mechanisms  to improve the accountability  of service providers.
Theoretical analysis  supports the proposition that exit is more efficient,  and hence more likely :o
be used by the public in services least affected  by market failure (eg., monopoly,  asymmetric
infcrmation),  whereas voice is more efficient under  conditions of market failure (see Annex 1 for
a more detailed discussion).  When a service provider is a monopoly,  the exit option as a means to
ensure public accountability  is not generally  open to its users. Whether  the monopoly  is due to
spatial  barriers which the poor in particular  cannot overcome (eg. a single local school or clinic
in a village) or due to economies  of scale, the implication is the same. Voice is the more efficient
option in the presence  of monopoly.  Asymmetric  information,  another cause of market failure,
3 See Paul (1991)  for a historical  perspective  on the evolution  of accountability  systems.
4  This model  can be specified  as A=f (HC)  = f(M,I),  when  A  public  accountability,  and M = monitoring
measures  and I = incentives  to service provider.
5 "Upward"  refers to the hierarchical  approach to control,  i.e., to superiors within  the organization  of
government,  and "outward' to the accountability  towards  the public at large, a horizontal  relationship.6
also has similar effects. Accountability  is made more difficult  because in the absence of
information,  providers can act opportunistically.  Here again,  voice rather than exit is predicted to
be the more effective  option. Voice may permit varying  degrees of participation  by the public in
decision making, external monitoring  and  joint action with service providers that could reduce
the asymrnetry  in information.
In order to influence  public accountability,  voice must work through  HC. 6 This is
because agency structures, and monitoring  and motivation  (incentives and disincentives)
functions are intermal  to  service providers  and their supervisory  agencies, and because
actions/responses  of providers will normally  be subject to HC. Voice can, however, counter the
subversive  tendencies on HC through  increased pressure  on decision makers, publicity,
withholding of payments,  and participation  of the public in key decisions.  The adverse
consequences  of ignoring these signals and potential  gains from public cooperation  are factors
that tend to modify provider behavior and to nudge it towards genuine public responsiveness.
The influence of voice will be sustained  when the provider agency's  organizational  structure,  and
monitoring  and incentive  systems motivate its staff to be responsive  to voice and to take actions
to improve service outcomes.
The Research Problem
Against this theoretical backdrop,  this study has explored two questions.  Does the
public's use of voice tend to improve service  provider accountability  under conditions of
monopoly?  Do changes in service provider accountability  lead to improved service outcomes?
V  oice and Accountability
The reasons why under monopoly  conditions,  the public is likely to use voice to
improve public accountability  have already been explained  above. A strong voice-accountability
relationship  can be expected to hold, however,  only when an adequate interval of time has
elapsed after voice begins to work. It is possible, for example, that when public service
performance is utterly disasuous and the public resorts to voice in protest, a perverse relationship
between voice and accountability  emerges in the short run. Service outcomes  may then continue
to be unsatisfactory.  It is inappropriate  therefore  to assess the impact  of voice by reference to its
initiation phase only.  We have therefore investigated  the voice-accountability-outcome
relationships  over a period of nearly four years  when the processes  involved  have had adequate
time to work themselves  out'.
6 We refer here to voice as it is the focus of our study. The same applies to exit-
The time required for voice to make an impact will clearly vary with the service and the local context. For the
irrigation  sector in Indonesia, a minimum of three years is considered reasonable by experts familiar with the
situation.7
The types-of  voice  mechanisms  used  to improve  accountability  will depend  on
certain  features  of the service  (eg.,  collective  vs. individualiy  consumable)  and chamcteristics
the users (eg., income  and education  levels,  locationi).  The variety  of voice mechanisms  that e)
(user grpups  with and without  service  fees/cost  sharing,  community  organizations,  committes
and boards  with users,  any of these  groups  with and without  extemal  assistce,  public  hearinl
ombudsman)  are-  a response  to thes- factors. The influerce  of these  diverse mechanisms  on
accountability  can  -be  expected  to vary significantly  and deserve  to be assessed  carefully.  In or
to keep this study manageable,  we have gathered  evidence  from two  important  variants  of voic
(1) formally  organized  water user  groups  with  specified  funcdons,  with  members  paying  a
service  fee to 'he provider,  and (2) similar  user  groups  -without  the service fee arrangement.  In
both  cases, an attempt  was made  to ascertain  whether  in fact thc introduction  of voice
mechanisms  was followed  by improved  service  provider  accountability.  As villages/water  uses
existed  in nearby  areas without  similar  voice mechanisms  during  the same period,  it was also:
possible  to compare  these results-  with the latters state  of accountability.'
In iigation,  the effectiveness-  of water user groups  as voice mechanisms  is
expected  to depend  on the types  of functions  they perform  vi.-a  ia the service  provider.  WNhile
there is no defintive theory  as to the influence  of specific  functions  on public  accountability,  il
reasonable  to assume  that uscr  participation  in the decision  making  processes  conceming  desig
of systems,  water delive&y,  etc., will  be more influential  than a consultative  role in these mattel
or their  function  as a source  of feedback  on service  to the provider.  Water  user groups paying
service fee for water, for example,  could be expected  to seek a more  active role in decision
-making,-  than those without  the fee. The sernce fee concept  was  introduced  in some parts of
Indonesia-  only in 1989-90.  Thc existence  of these two sets of water  user groups,  one with servi
fee and the other without,  offered  a basis for testing  the differential  impact  of these two variant
of voice  on accountability.  The differential  impact-was  postulated  to-depend-on  two factors,  (1)
the extent to which wate users were inclined  to exert pressure  on the provider  because  they  pa
a service fee, and (2)  the motivation  that the service  fee induced  in the provider  to be more
responsive  to users since  it was a source  of income to the service  provider.
A test of the differential  impact  of the two voice  mechanisms required  that othe
features  such as functions  of user grcups (except  fee collection),  features  of the service  provide
including  resource availability,  the technology  of the irigation system,  community  power
structure  (eg., size of farms,  income  levels)  and characteristics  of users were comparable  across
the cases to be studied.  Otherwise,  a test of the differential  impact  of voice with  and without
service fee would be impossible.  Consistent  with  this approach,  random  samples  of user groups
with and without service  fees were selected,  but with  minimal  variations  -in  all other variables8
For purposes-of  the study,  we decided  to focus on the three dimensions  of public
accountability  summarized  below. Public accountability  could be said to have improved  when (1)
the service provider is more  responsive  to the users' needs, (2) the provider makes known and
complies with certain "rules  of the game"  that enable the users to perforn their tasks efficiently,
and (3) the provider decentralizes  the agency structure  and adapts its internal  monitoring and
incentive  systems to be more responsive  to the users. The measures  listed below were designed
to assess the changes in these three dimensions  of accountability  in response to voice.
- Rempou3iyeness.  A service  provider's  responsiveness  to the public  can be rated in
telms of the response  to user complaints.  Changes in the volume of complaints, the time taken to
deal with complaints and public satisfaction  with their resolution can be used as measures of
responsiveness.  Satisfaction  has to be assessed  in relation to the expectations  of people..  It is
possible,  for example, that people may begin to expect more as they get better informed  and
exchange experiences  in groups as a result of voice.  The same response  from a provider may tend
to satisfy such organized and active.  groups  less than, say, poorly informed  groups  with lower
expectations.  The interpretation  of responsiveness  measures  therefore  need to take into account
these factors.
Compliance  With the Rules of the Game Public agencies  invariably  have a
charter and certain "rules  of the game"  that govern their transactions  with the public. In irrigation,
the existence  of "water rights" is an example of such rules. It is a mark of  good public
accountability  for an agency  to disseminate  to the relevant public  the ground  rules and norms of
conduct that govern its dealings with the public.  If they do not exist or are not disseminated  to the
public, the agency's accountability  can be said to be weak. Increased  openness  that participation
through voice brings about can by itself induce  the provider to comply with the rules of the game.
Similarly,  when the provider announces  or jointly decides with user groups  the water allocation
plans and maintenance  schedules  for a crop cycle, it facilitates  the users' performance  of their
essential tasks in farming.  Transparency  through  information  sharing of this kind may pertain to
the entire spectrum  of a provider's activities  such as service delivery  and maintenance.  The
announcement  of the plans and schedules does not necessarily  mean that they will be complied
with, though transparency  tends to make arbitrary  actions  more difficult.
Decentralization Monitoring  and Incentives While the impact of voice on
accountability  can be measured  in terms of complaints  and compliance,  whether  this behavior
will be sustained  can be judged only by the evidence on the changes  in the provider's  internal
organizational  structure,  and monitoring  and incentive  systems (HC). The need to be responsive
to the public can be expected to induce the agency  to decentralize  its operations.  There are
different  ways to measure decentralization,  but the two tests.pertinent  to irrigation  are (1)
whether the responsibility  and authority  to negotiate  with user groups and resolve  conflicts have
been delegated downwards,  and (2) whether  resources have been made available  at lower levels
to respond to user groups. Improved  accountability  will also require a shift in the focus of the
agency's monitoring  (formal and informal) to areas of concern to the water users, and greater
attention  to staff incentives so as to motivate  agency staff to be responsive  to voice. For example,if service  fee is an income  to the provider,  there  will  be a strong  incendve  for  the staff  to be
responsive  to users.  Such  changes  in monitoring  and incentive  systems  cannot  be implemented
and  sustained  without  a decentralized  agency  structure.
In light  of the above,  sample  surveys  of farmers  were  undertaken  to obtain  data  on
the following  measures  of improved  accountability:
- decrease  in the time  taken  by provider  to resolve
user  complaints
- decline in the number of complaints
- user  satisfacdon  with  the resolution  of complaints
- public information  on the "rules  of the game'
governing  the transactions  between  the provider  and  users
- user satisfaction  with compliance
- decentralization  of  responsibility  and  authority  to
lower  levels  to negotiate  and resolve  user  complaints/conflicts
c-  ontrol  over  financial  and  staff  resources  at lower  levels  to
respond  to user  needs/problems
Where  voice  mechanisms  are at work,  one would  expect  a positive  change  in the
provider's  responsiveness  to the public,  compliance  with  rules  of the game,  and  in the provider
agency's  organizational  structure,  and  monitoring  and incentive  systems.  A positive  change  in
any of these  dimensions  would  signify  an improvement  in public  accountability.  In general,
changes  in responsiveness  and compliance  are expected  to go together.  If, however,
decentralization  and a suitable  adaptation  of monitoring  and incentives  failed  to occur  in the
provider  agency  while  progress  in responsiveness  and compliance  was  achieved,  a plausible
conclusion  is that the sustainability  of the apparent  change  in accountability  is in doubt.  Internal
changes/reforms  in the structure  and management  of the agency  are thus  a necessary  condition
for the institutionalization  of improved  accountability.  Data  on these  changes  were sought  from
service  providers  and  the users  of the service.  Interviews  with  users  and provider  records  were
used  to generate  both  quantitative  and qualitative  data  for  comparing  the accountability  changes
between the different  sets  of cases  with  and without  voice.
Accountability  and Outcomes
Service  outcomes  are created  through  the actions  taken  by providers  who  have  the
resources  and  skills  to carry  them  out.  The  public  has no direct  means  to improve  service10
outcomes. Hence our assumption  that enhanced accountability  is the mediating variable that
induces providers to generate  improved outcomes. This implies that an increase in provider
responsiveness and compliance, and the reinforcement  of these behaviors through changed
agency structures, monitoring  and incentives are the conditions  required for service outcomes to
improve9.  Thus when a service  provider agrees with a water users' group on a water allocation
schedule  and disseminates  information  about it to all members, a basis is created to provide
reliable water delivery (a desired  service outcome) to users and to reduce the probability of
arbitrary action by the provider.
Exploration  of our second question required an assessment  of both accountability  and
service outcomes. An approach  to the assessment  of accountability  has already been given above.
Measurement of service outcomes  calls for an analysis of the different  dimensions of a provider's
performance that the public  values. In irrigation, as noted above, satisfactory  outcomes  can be
said to exist when the service is performed efficiently  and equitably.  But perfornance is achieved
within certain public policy guidelines.  Hence it was important  to investigate the accountability-
outcomes relationship across senrice providers who faced similar public policy constraints in
terms of resources, technology, and cost structures.  When the latter variables are comparable,
variability in outcomes in terms of efficiency and equity between the cases with and without
accountability  change could  be attributed solely to the change in public accountability.
There is no aprigori  reason to believe that enhanced accountability  through  the use
of voice would improve outcomes  in terms of both efficiency and equity. It is possible, for
example, that if the service  provider operated  well within the production possibility frontier,
there would be no trade off between these two outcomes.  In theory, if the provider is on the
frontier, there is likely to be a trade off between efficiency and equity as he moves from one point
to another on the curve.
Measures of efficiency and equity  to judge service outcomes are available in the
irrigation literature. Crop intensity of the farm (each crop season counts as 100%  in one year) has
been used in this study as an efficiency outcome  measure'". Variation in the crop intensity of
farms between upstream and downstream  villages was selected as the equity measure.  Both are
geneally  accepted measures  in irrigation.
Service outcomes are a function also of several variables other than
accountability. Changes  in public policy that cause budget cuts, staff reduction and shifts in
bThey  are not, however,  sufficient  conditions  for service  outcomes  to improvc As noted below,  outcomes  are
determined  jointly by several other  variables  independent  of accountability  change.
'e  when a farmer cultivates his land fully in three seasons, his crop intensity  is rated as 300. In Indonesia,  some
farmers are known to have a crop intensity  of 400 which  means fill!  utilization  of his farmland  throughout  the
yean-11
national  priorities could cause outcomes  to behave in ways inconsistent  with the improvement in
accountability.  While analyzing  and interpreting  our results, it was therefore  necessary first to
examine whether extraneous factors  (shift parameters)  were responsible  for the results.
The ReseXihnMethdology
The basic methodclogical  problem in this research was to find a satisfactory way
to empirically isolate the influence  of accountability  on service outcomes  in a country or sector,
context given that a multiplicity  of variables  jointly deterine  such outcomes. A comprehtesive
model that treats service  outce'nes as a function of the relevant variables  including accountability
is often difficult to specify and was considered to be too complex and expensive in terms of data
collection to provide a useful basis for a test of the two hypotheses.  An alternative  approach
adopted in this study was to select  cases involving  voice that permitted a comparison  of the
changes in the outcomes and accountability  in irrigation  service while other variables influencing
performance  remained constant.  The comparison  was based on a before and after "voice"
alongside  control cases without voice.  Given the control on other vanables, the change in service
outcomes,  if any, was attibutable only to the change  in accountability. Admittedly,  the most
difficult  part of this methodology  was the issue of keeping other variables constant. Here a
careful scrutiny of the independent  variables that influence  the service in question was
undertaken  to ensure that the control assumption  was justified. The main vranables  investigated
were the resources, technology  and equipment  available to the service providers in the selected
areas, and the size, crops and other characteristics of the user groups/villages.
While the confidence  in our research findings will increase as the variety of
services and countries included  in the study increases,  given the plausibility  of-the  theory
underlying the hypotheses,  it was felt that a total of twelve villages (eight with the use of voice
and four without) were sufficient for an initial zest  of our questions. An inter-country
comparison  of cases was not a real option as it is extremely  difficult to keep other factors
constant across countries. It was therefore considered  proper to focus on a limited range of cases
to improve our understanding  of the mechanisms  and relationships  involved rather than to search
for generalilit  through the analysis of a statistically valid sample size. Based on this
approach, ajudgmental sample of twelve  villages/water  user groups  was selected as follows:
(1) Four villages/water  users' groups with voice mechanisms  including the service
fee (Group l).
(2) Four villages/water  users' groups with voice mechanisms,  but without the
service fee (Group 2).
(3) Four villages  without voice mechanisms  including service fee/cost  recovery
(the Control Group).12
Before  the villages/user  groups were selected, discussions  were held %...th  experts
in Indonesia  to identify  a region where the same service provider operated  and the control
assumption seemed reasonable. East  Java province  was thus identified  as the region from which
the sample villages/water  user groups were to be selected. Two districts,  Nganjuk and Kediri,
that came closest to satisfying  the control assumption  were identified within East Java. Nganjuk
was known for its active water user associations  (WUAs)  and many of them had also some
experience with the irrigation service fee concept (ISF). Kediri was reported to have villages with
active WUAs but no ISF as well as villages without  functioning  WUAs.  These districts had
irrigation  subsystems that were rehabilitated  in the late 1980s,  making them comparable  in terms
of technology. Lists of villages from the two districts  were prepared and then subdivided  into the
three categories  given above. The sample villages  from the three categories  were selected on a
judgmental basis in consultation  with experts in the field. For each village, a list of farmers was
prepared from official records and a random sample of 20-30 fanners per WUA/village  was
selected for interview and observation  by the local consultant and his investigators.
Selection  of the Service and Country
As noted above, irrigation  in Indonesia  was selected  for testing the voice-
accountability-outcome  relationship.  The exploratory  nature of the research, the need to gain an
in depth understanding  of the ways in which voice and accountability  work and impact on service
outcomes,  and the data availability  for field work in Indonesia  were the major reasons for this
choice. Irigation is also important from the standpoint  of poverty alleviation and the target
groups  relevant to this service consist of the vast majority of developing  country  populations. In
spite of the heavy investments  in this service over the years, there is a growing concern about
their limited effectiveness and the relative lack of accountability  of the large public agencies
responsible for the projects. Ways and means  to improve public accountability  and performance
in this sector is therefore of considerable  interest to many most developing  country govemments.
In the field of irrigation,  Indonesia  has several projects in which voice
mechanisms have been at work. A recent initiative  of the Government  of Indonesia (1989) has
supported the creation and functioning  of farmer groups  with service fee to exercise voice in
selected  project areas while other project areas were left without such voice mechanisms.  Since
the farmers, crops, sois,  the system technology and other relevant variables were comparable
across project areas in selected regions of the country, this project provided an ideal laboratory
for the proposed research.
Field research in this study involved  the identification  and analysis  of the data on
(1) the outcomes of the irrigation  service over time in the selected villages/farms,  (2) the changes
in public accountability  of the service  provider over the same period,  (3) features of the voice
mechanisms  and their modalities,  and (4) the roles and functions  of the service  providers and
external agents, if any, in the relevant areas. The dimensions  of outcomes  examined  were those
that could be reasonably expected to remain within the control of a service  provider. In all cases,
1988  was taken as the year when WUAs and voice were considered non-existent  or weak. The13
data for this year was then compared with the data collected for 1993 (dry season)  as a basis for
deriving changes over time ("before" and "after").
Data on outcomes, accountability  and voice mechanisms  were generated  in each
village through  individial interviews of the users and the staff of service providers and where
appropriate,  with external intervenors, with the aid of a structured questionnaire. Trained
investigators  lived for three weeks or more in the selected  villages to interview users and service
provider staff and to obtain data on service outcomes,  responsiveness,  compliance,  features of
voice mechanisms,  and the roles and functions  of service  providers (including  their
organizational  structure,  monitonrng  and incentives)  and external agents. Scaling techniques  were
used to quantify the participants'  assessment  of the different dimensions  of accountability  and
outcomes. An open ended part of the interview  was used by the local investigators  to probe new
aspects  and issues that surfaced in the interviews. Interviews  were also used to assess the
relative importance  respondents  attached to the different dimensions  of service outcomes.
Interviews  with senrice providers and external agents were used to generae data,
both quantitative  and qualitative,  on their organizational  mechanisms and strategies for dealing
with voice. Service providers  had data on several dimensions  of outcomes  and accountability  and
were the only source of data on agency  structure,  service monitoring  and the role of incentives.
Well before field work began, investigators  were given adequate training and
opportunities  to observe and understand the activities  and actors relevant to their work- To
illustrate, information  on the specific voice mechanisms  in use and the underlying organizational
arrangements,  service providers'  agency structures,  their processes  and procedures  for monitoring
service delivery  and outcomes, and linkages with staff incentives,  budgets  and staff resources
available for service providers  in the areas under study (to estimate public costs), the nature and
impact of political  and policy influences  from above on provider behavior, the costs of voice (
collective action  by user groups),  equity issues and conflict  resolution, incentives/penalties
affecting cooperative  behavior among  the groups/agencies  involved, and the response of users to
the critical processes and support  provided by exta-nal agents were prepared as inputs for the
comprehensive  case studies of WUAs. Case studies required investigators  both to observe
service  related events as they unfolded  over time (eg., over a dry season crop cycle) and to
dialogue  with the  groups  and individuals  pertinent to the field research.14
Chapter 3
Voice:  The Mechanisms  at Work
The positive role that local farmer  organizations  can play in water management
has been well documented  in the irrigation  literature.  Water user associations  (WUAs)
voluntarily formed  by farmers  at the local level are reported to have minimized  the "failures"
associated  with water management  by both the state and the market while contributing  to greater
equity in water distribution.  WUAs are clearly the pre-eminent  manifestation  of voice in the
irrigation  sector. The empirical evidence on the outcomes  of WUAs is, however, mixed (Bardhan
93). Case studies from several  countries support the hypothesis  that the effectiveness  of WUAs is
positively correlated  with the degrec of homogeneity  of farmers  in terms of the size of the farn,
income,  etc.
Our case studies provided information  on a wide range of voice mechanisms
being used by Indonesian WUAs.  The identification  of voice mechanisms  was done by-  applying
the following  three criteria (1) Did the WUA activity  provide a forum  for continued  interaction
with the service provider? (2) Did the WUA practice or activity encourage  members  to demand
better performance  or responsiveness  from the service provider? (3) Did interactions  with service
providers involve farmer  representatives  when collective  action by all members seem
inappropriate  or infeasible?.  A mechanism  qualified as voice when it met one or more of the
three criteria
In all five voice mechanisms  were found to be at work in the Indonesian WUAs
included  in our sample.  We discuss  below the nature, scope and features of these mechanisms
and the types of WUAs where they were found.  Additional details  about the sample
villages/WUAs are provided in Annex 2 at the end of the monograph.
1. Tertiary Canal Maintenance  Groups
A typical forum available  to the farmers  for interaction  with the service  provider
was the tertiary canal maintenance  group. The need to meet as a group-  to decide on and organize
maintenance  provided an opportunity  for farmers  in a locality  to talk about their common
problems and needs and to take them up with the authorities.  The WUAs were responsible  for the
maintenance  of the tertiary canals serving their members  while the irrigation  agency was
responsible  for the repair and maintenance  of the primary and secondary  canals of the irrigation
system.  Tertiary canal maintenance  was organized  by the WUAs through  periodic  collective
action (voluntary  labor) by members.  Maintenance  work was done four to six times a year and
the range of involvement  of members  in the villages  in this activity was between 80% and 100%.
Villagers  here have had a long tradition  of collective  action ("gotong  royong" in the local
language)  that WUAs have formalized  for water management.  Service  provider staff have15
traditionally  used these groups to inform  farmers about water allocation  schedules and about
changes in the plans.  This meant that the tertiary  canal maintenance  groups were a forum for
mutual interaction  in which both farmers and the service provider were interested. The group
facilitated  and sustained  collective  action and disciplinary  norms among  farmers. For the service
provider,  it provided an efficient means of communication  with farmers.
As a voice mechanisms,  these groups  clearly had some limitations.  They were
typically small groups of farmers  sharing a tertiary  canal. Their interactions  were with the lowest
level provider staff. Serious problems  of water allocation or of maintenance  could not be sorted
out at that level.  When these groups  were organized  and supported  by a WUA, they had more
clout and a better chance of being heard. The primary building block of all WUAs was the
tertiary canal maintenance  group.
2. Periodic WIUA  Meetings  with Provider Start
An important  activity of the WUA Committee  is its monthly meeting with service
provider staff in the locality to review  the problems  being faced by its members with respect to
water allocation,  maintenance,  etc. The committee  naturally represents  all its members. In large
WUAs, the block leaders who represent  the tertiary  canal maintenance  groups  also participate  in
these meetings. WUA members  are given information  on these meetings in the village office or
in the fields. Case studies of some of our villages  report that weekly meetings were held with
members by WUA officials in the dry season  when water shortage  posed a serious threat to the
farmers. Problems and complaints were heard and acted on in these meetings. Farmer interest in
the meetings are reported to vary a great deal depending  on whether  members  had pressing
problems to discuss.  Every ten days, the local irrigation  official was required to report on water
allocation and on the condition of canals to the district irrigation office.  The key irrigation
official  with whom  WUAs interfaced  regularly is the local irrigation  official.
Two features of this voice mechanism  deserve to be noted. First, the increased
frequency of meetings during the dry season  is a response to an important  farmer need. Since the
timing and adequacy  of water in the dry season are key to his success,  the farner benefits most
from an arrangement  that can sort out problems  on the spot and provides him information  fast.
This is what weekly meetings  can do. Second,  periodic  meetings at the WUA level, gives greater
visibility to the farmer's problems.  Tertiary canal level meetings  are not a match for what a WUA
can do. The voice of the farmer derives  greater power and urgency simply  from the auspices
under which the meetings are organized.  WUA can play an active  joint monitoring  role here that
individual farmers cannot do. Water allocation  schedules, for example, are posted on notice
boards for all members  to see. The openness  of the proceedings  promotes  transparency  and
minimizes the scope for opportunism  and collusion  by some farmers and provider staff.16
3. Irrigation Service Fee and Exemptions
In the first group of four villages in our sample, the rights and responsibilities  of
-WUA  members with regard to water allocation and the obligations  of the service provider
(irrigation  agency and the district government)  were stated in a water service  agreement signed
annually by the Chief of the WUA Federation  (a network  of several WUIAs  in a given area) and
the district irrigation agency  head. Copies of the agreement  were available  in all the four villages.
The agreement  required that WUA members  pay an irrigation  service fee (ISF) to the government
to partially meet the cost of the irrigation  service,  especially  the cost of primary and secondary
canal maintenance.  WUAs were responsible  for collecting  ISF from members.  ISF was paid to
the district revenue office and was available  to meet the canal maintenance  needs at the local
level. Farners were required to pay a fine if ISF was not paid on time.  If more than 50% of
members failed to pay ISF, the irrigation  official  was required to close the tertiary  gate and deny
water to the WUA involved.  If, on the other hand, the irrigation  agency failed to deliver water as
promised,  farmers had the right to ask for exemption  from ISP for that  season. Procedures  and
criteria for eligibility  were prescribed  for this purpose.
The introduction  of ISF required that WUAs register the farms of their members
and keep records of the planted and harvested  areas  every crop season. Registration  also involved
the verification  of the ownership of land. Since technical and record keeping matters were
involved, WtlAs were assisted  in this process by community  organizers  provided to them
through a consultancy  firm contracted  by the govermment  under the ISF project.  Community
organizers had worked with WUA officials  in the villages in the initial phase of registration  of
farms and nelped them set up the required record keeping systems.
It is estimated  that on the average  a farner member  incurred an annual cost of Rp.
6000 ($3.00) to finance the collective  activities  of the WUA. To this, if the cost of voluntary
labor for canal maintenance  is added, the total annual  cost of collective  action per farmer would
amount to Rp.31000 ($ 15.50).  The per hectare  ISF on farmers  in the villages under study in
1993 was Rp. 18000  ($ 9.00). The ISF cost per farmer per year thus works out to $3.00
(assuming  an average  farm size of 0.33 ha). East Java farms are unusually  small in size, but
intensively  cultivated throughout  the year. The single  largest element of cost of collective  action
for the farmer is that of voluntary  labor for canal maintenance.
The irrigation  service fee and exemption  from payment  under certain conditions
can be interpreted as a voice mechanism  in the Indonesian  context.  For the government,  there is
no doubt that ISF is a cost recovery  mechanism-  Its introduction  was clearly induced  by the
financial crunch  faced by the government But for the farmers,  ISF has provided a strong basis
for demanding  increased  reliability  and adequacy  of water and better canal maintenance  from the
irrigation agency-  As the obligations  of both farmers and the service provider are laid out in a
legal agreement,  it is now possible for the farmer to express his dissatisfaction  with the service
by seeking  exemption from ISF. In brief, ISF has transfomed the farmer from a meek recipient17
of a public service  to a vigilant  customer  who seeks value for money by demanding
accountability  from the service  provider.
ISF is an unconventional  voice mechanism.  Most manifestations  of voice take on
an organizational  form. ISF, on the other hand, is an economic  instrument  that has modified the
behavior of farmers in some interesting  ways. It has also triggered  a number  of organizational
changes. ISF clearly has given more teeth to the WUAs. It has, for example, added to the
functions and activities of WIJAs as will be explained  below. It has made obligations  of farmers
and service provider  alike more transparent.  It has strengthened  the farmers' incentive  for
collective  action and for a careful monitoring  of the performance  of the service provider.
Payment  of and exemptions  from ISF are thus a signal that qualifies as a voice mechanism.
4. Wakkthrough  UbyWUA
An annual exercise  called "waLkthrough"  provided  farmers with an opportunity  to
have an influence  on the repair and maintenance  of the primary and secondary  canals by the
irrigation  agency. This was unique  to the WUAs that paid ISF. The legal agreement  between the
farmers and the irrigation  agency  provided for the walkthrough  in villages  covered by the ISF
system.  By paying a fee for the service, the farmers  earned the right to influence  the agenda and
budget  for canal repair and maintenance.  Needless to say, the government's  investment in the
rehabilitation  and improvement  of the irrigation  syatem provided the foundation  for the adoption
of the practice of walkthrough.  Without  such investments,  the maintenance  of canals by itself
would not not have made much differnce.
The annual walkthrough  involved  ajoint inspection  of the canals  by farmer
representatives  and irrigation  officials  in order to identify and agree upon repair needs and
priorities. There was an understanding  that the fees collected from the fanners would be used to
meet canal maintenance  needs. The WUA Federation  (the association  of WUAs in a sub-district)
was responsible for this activity from the farmers' side.
The watkthrough  was formalized  through the legal agreement It provided an open
forum for the farmers to express their concerns about canal maintenance  and to get them
translated  into budgetary allocations.  Furthermore,  it offered  a basis for the VWUAs  to monitor the
maintenance  and repair activities  of the irrigation  agency. As a voice mechanism,  it enabled
farmers to make an impact at the policy  level.
5. The District Irrigation Committee
Farmers were able to play a similar role at the local government  level through  the
district irrigation committee.  This commnittee  was created at the district level to coordinate  and
oversee the planning and management  of irrigation.  It is chaired by the head of the district
(Bupati) and its members included  the distrct level chiefs of Irrigation,  Planning,  Agricultural
Service, Economics Division,  Finance Division, and WUA Federations.  Its main functions  were18
to plan the water allocation for the next planting  season, to program the cropping pattern in the
irrigated area, to plan the maintenance  of all irrigation  facilities,  to prepare the ISF budget and
ISF collection, and to coordinate,  guide, monitor and evaluate the ISF program in the district.  Its
meetings provided opportunities  to plan and share information  among members on all aspects of
irrigation  in both ISF and non-ISF  areas, to resolve implementation  problems,  and to guide and
monitor the activities of the field officials involved.  The presence  of the chiefs of WUA
Federations  made it possible for farmer  concerns and viewpoints to be presented  in the
Committee.  The Irrigation  Commnittee  had responsibility  for both ISF and non-ISF villages  in the
district.
Participation  of farmer representatives  in the Irrigation Committee  provided an
opportunity  to the WUAs to influence  policies  and budget  allocations affecting the irrigation
service in their area. This voice mechanism  was an effective  means at a higher leveL  to reinforce
the feedback farmers  were already  providing through  their groups at the ground level. It cut
through  the handicaps that farmers  usually faced because of long distances  and lack of access to
the higher levels of public agencies.
A careful review of the five voice mechanisms  discussed above shows how they
can be used to enhance accountability  at different levels.  The first three mechanisms presented
here are serice  related  in the sense that they are closely linked to service delivery.  They also
imply the direct involvement  of farmers. A majority  of farmers  participate  in canal maintenance
and all farmers in Groups 1 and 2 are members of the tertiary  canal maintenance  groups.  Mlonthly
or weekly meetings with officials involved  many farmers  in the first two groups and provided
them opportunities  to sort out their service related  problems  and complaints.  By paying ISF,
farmers in Group 1 were encouraged  to demand that they be heard. Non-payment  of ISF by
farmers was a signal of dissatisfaction  from farmers to the service provider.
Walkthrough  and the irrigation  committee,  on the other hand, are indirect
mechanisms  that are pQlihrclated  rather than mechanisms  linked to service delivery.
Walkthrough  generated  the agenda for maintenance  and influenced the district level budget  for
maintenance.  The Irrigation Committee  was concerned  with policy and program implementation
in the district as a whole. Farmer  involvement in both cases was through their representatives.
The impact of these voice mechanisms  was thus indirect,  and at the policy level rather than at
the service delivery level.
Farmer participation  is built into almost all voice mechanisms. But there can be
mechanisms  such as ISF which does not fit the classical concept  of participation. ISF is a fee
collected  by government. The practice of paying  a fee for service,  however, induces the farmer
to bring "voice"  into play. Refusal to pay the fee or to seek exemption from the fee is also voice.
In this sense, voice mechanisms  can have a range that goes beyond participation.
Voice in the Sample Villages19
The key question is, what did these voice mechanisms do in our sample villages?
What was their influence  on accountability  and service outcomes?  Before exploring these
questions,  it is,necessary  to outline the combinations  of voice found in the villages.
Four out of the twelve villages  (Group 1) in our study had all five voice
mechanisms  in place. These villages were in a district where ISF had been introduced.  The next
four villages selected from the neighboring  district (Group  2) had only the first two voice
mechanisms  at work. ISF had not yet been introduced  in this area. The last set of four villages
(the control group) had no active WUAs and hence,no  voice mechanisms  to speak of. In general,
voice mechanisms got activated  in Groups 1 and 2 when in the late eighties steps were taken to
strengthen  and restructure  WUAs mostly  in the wake of the rehabilitation  of the irrigation
systems in the area. The Government  clearly played  an active role in this process.
As recently as five years ago (in 1988),  none of these villages  had voice
mechanisms in the present form and intensity.  At best, tertiary  canal maintenance  groups were in
existence in some cases. The major changes in voice thus occurred in the past four or five years.
It is possible now to examine the changes over time that have occurred  in terms of service
provider accountability  and service outcomes  in the first two group. of villages  where different
combinations  of voice have been at work. We then compare the results with the experience of the
control group over the same period. The findings are presented in the next chapter.20
Chapter 4
Accountability  and Outcomes: The Evidence
The evidence on the impact of voice on service  provider accountability  can be
divided into two parts. (1) Improved accountability  can be expected  to make the farmer more
satisfied with service delivery. A structured  farmer survey  was used to assess farmer  views on the
subject before and after voice mechanisms  were initiated.  An important part of the evidence thus
consists of structured  farmer feedback  and field level observations.  (2) The second part pertains
to the internal organizational  changes and new  practices initiated  by the service provider to be
more accountable  to the fanner. The evidence was generated  through interviews  with provider
agency officials  and a study of official  documents.  The findings  are then synthesized  under the
three heads outlined  in Chapter 2, namely,  responsiveness,  compliance,  and decentralization  and
incentives. This is followed by a similar assessment  of service outcomes  before and after voice
was introduced,  using evidence from the farmer survey.
Farnier  Febc 
Farmers in Groups I and 2 have had experiences  with provider agencies  before
and after they became members  of a WUA. This was not relevant to the farmers  in the dtird set
(the control group)  as their interactions  with these agencies  were more limited and fairly steady
over the years, but without any involvement  in active  WUAs. Changes  in the behavior of
agencies could be considered more  positive and accountable  if farmers felt more satisfied than
before with (1) agency  planning for water management,  (2) the actual water allocations  they
received, (3) the agency responses  to their complaints, and if (4) the proportion  of farmers with
complaints, and (5) the time taken by agency  staff to respond to complaints  had gone down. The
farmer survey was so structured  that data on changes in farmer assessments  of these dimensions
over time within the same group of villages  and between different  groups at the same time could
be generated. Variations  in accountability  over time between groups of villages  with different
voice mechanisms were expected to be captured  through  this approach.
The fanmer  survey produced  usable feedback  from 288 farmers selected on a
random sample  basis from the 12 villages  in our sample.  This sample accounted  for seven per
cent of the farmers  in the 12 villages. The survey  was conducted  during the dry season of 1993
by investigators  who lived in the villages  for three to four weeks and interviewed  farmers with
the aid of a structured  questionnaire.  The number  of returns received from the villages ranged
from 19 to 28 per village.  For the three sets of villages,  the returns received  were 98, 99 and 91
respectively.
The results of the analysis  of farmer  feedback  are presented  in Table i below for
the two sets of sample villages with voice. A comparison  of the results between the groups  is21
then attempted.  The major dinfsions  of feedback summarized  below pertain to farmer
satisfaction  with water allocation  planning,  actual water allocations,  maintenance,  and
resolution  of complaints.  The proportion  of farmers making  complaints  and the time taken
(numnber  of days) to resolve complaints  are also reported in the table. Farner satisfaction
with these dimensions  provide useful infornation to judge how well agency activities  with
espect to water management  planoing,  water allocation,  maintenance  and the resolution  of
complaints  and conflicts  are being canried  out. In order to derive measures of satisfaction  a
scale of 1-7 was used, :with  and 7 representing  te  lowest and highest levels of
satisfaction  respcvely.
Table I
Indicators  of Satisfaction
Measre.  Group 1  Group 2
(ISF WUAs)  (Non-ISF  WUAs)
1988  1993  %A  1988  .1993  - %
Satisfaction  with:
- Water management planning  3.52  5.25  49.1  4.7  5.40  .46.5
.Water allocation received  3.47  5.28  52.2  4.65  5.29  13.8
- Maintenance  by PW  3S2  5.47  55.4  -5.13  5.31.  3.5
Rnse  to complaints-  3.13  3.19  .1.9  5.03  4.96  (1.4)
Proportion  of complaints(Y)  25.00 21.10  15.6  25.00  14.90 40.4
Response  time (no. of days)  5.33  3.67  .31.2  2.54  2.29  9.822
Several conclusions  flow from an analysis of the above data.
1. Within Group 1 villages,  there has been a marked improvement  in farmer
satisfaction  in respect of water management  planning, actual water allocations  made, and
maintenance  over a period of four years (before  and after voice/active  WUAs).  There is evidence
also of a decline in the proportion  of farmers  making complaints and in the response time taken
by agency staff to resolve complaints.  In all respects, Group 1 villages seem to have started from
a low base of average  or below average levels of satisfaction with respect to these three functions
before their WUAs became active.
2. With regard to one important  function,  namely,  responsiveness  to complaints,
Group I is not only below average,  but shows  only marginal  improvement.  This is despite the
decline in the proportion of farmers  complaining  and reduction  in the response  time. Further
disaggregation  of the data shows that the complaints  problem is concentrated  in the two
downstream  villages in this group. The percentage  of complaints from the other two villages add
up to only 3%. This shows that there are probably some chronic problems  of service  in the
downstream  villages that have not been addressed  by service providers  in the new ISF regime.
3. Group 2 villages  also appear to have made good progress in three out of the
four dimensions.  The proportion of farmers with complaints  has declined significantly  and the
response time for resolving  complaints  has also come down. On the other hand, satisfaction
levels among those complaining seem to have worsened a bit. Overall, however,  these villages
started  from relatively higher satisfaction  levels in all scores. The progress achieved by them
over time is therefore not as impressive as in the first group. In both cases, the decline in the
proportion of farmers'with-complaints-is  a more significant  feature to note than the stagnant
levels of satisfaction  with responsiveness  to complaints.
4. For the control group, comparable  data on levels of satisfaction  over time are
not available.  But in the dry season of 1993,  this group's satisfaction  scores  for water
management  planning (5.09), water allocations  (4.96) and maintenance  (4.79) were consistently
below the scores of Groups 1 and 2 in the same season. Since the responding  farmers have
unanimously  reported that their level of service has remained  the same in the past four years, it
is reasonable to conclude that traditional  water management  practices have remained in force
here with no substantial  change during a period when practices have undergone  changes in the
other two groups.
5. Farmers  in the first two groups  highlighted reliability  , equity and adequacy of
water as the three most important  benefits they derived from their membership  of WUAs.
Reliable supply of water was noted by seven out of the eight villages.  Equitable distribution of
water was mentioned  by five out of the eight villages.  Three out of eight highlighted adequacy of
water as an important  benefit.23
6. Ncarly 91% of the farmers  in the first group and 81% in the second group
.confirmed  that taking everything  into account  they were better off in 1993  than before they
joined active WUAs. On a scale of I to 7, the satisfaction  score of the first group  was 5.44 and
that of the second group was 5.47. Overall, these scorns  could be interpreted to imply a
comparableand high level of satisfaction (in the post-voice/active  WUA period)  among the
respondents from the two groups. In contrast,  the control  group farmers  indicated their condition
had remained the same with respect to irrigation  in the past four years.
The Three Dimensions  of Accountability
The findings  of the farmer  survey and the evidence from service provider staff can
now be pooled together to gauge the impact  of voice on provider accountability.  While
responsiveness  and compliance  are direct measures  of accountability,  changes in decentralization
and agency incentives  are also important as they have a bearing on the sustainability  of improved
accountability.
esponsiveness
Judged by the three measures  of responsiveness  given below, Groups I and 2 in
our sample have given evidence of a positive association  between voice and accountability  in the
post-voice period.  The three measures  used were the proportion  of farmers with complaints, the
response time for the resolution  of complaints and farmer satisfaction  with the response to
complaints. With respect to the proportion  of farmers  with complaints and response time, there
is a notable improvement  over time (see Table 1 above).  With respect to satisfaction  with the
response to complaints, show a marginal  improvement  over time while the Group 2 villages
have remained  almost at the same level.
In the long run, one would  expect voice mechanisms  to lead to an improvement  in
the public's satisfaction  with the resolution  of complaints.  Changes in the first two measures  of
responsiveness  confirm this hypothesis.  The problem is with the third measure (satisfaction  with
response)  which does not show a major improvement.  Slow change in this regard need not,
however, be interpreted as an undesirable  outcome.  As noted above, people measure their
satisfaction against some implicit  standards or expectations.  It is possible, for example, that the
very process of using voice could raise expectations  and  encourage farmers  to use standards that
an agency is unable to meet right away. Consequently,  farmers  may not report any improvement
in their satisfaction  for a while. When farmers are better informed about water allocation plans
and norms and they pay a fee for the service, they are likely  to be less tolerant about poor service
and violation of agreements.  The process of complaining  and demanding  better service is what
eventually improves  the standards of service and response  to complaints.  Some measure of
dissatisfaction  may therefore be a positive feature. That this is a reasonable  conclusion  is borne
out by the finding reported  above on the overall  satisfaction  felt by farmers in the first two groups
over time. The overwhelming  response  from both groups  was that they were much better off in24
1993  than before their WUAs became active." In general,  farmer  responses  to questions  show
that that they were able to differentiate  between their experiences  with the multiple dimensions
of the service delivered  to them despite the problem of recall.
Compliance
The measures  of compliance with the "rules  of the game" proposed  in Chapter 2
were; (1) availability  of public information  on the "rules  of the game" and openness  governing
the transactions between the service provider and users (transparency);  (2) dissemination  of water
allocation  plans and maintenance  schedules  to facilitate  action  by users; and (3) user satisfaction
with compliance. In irrigation,  rules of the garne  concern the planning and allocation  of water to
farmers, the maintenance  of canals  and the payment  of fees or user charges, if any. The two
groups of villages  under study are exaamined  below in terms of the evidence on these measures.
Transparency  of Process  In the first two groups,  membership  of active WUAs
has given farmers a good understanding  of their "water  rights". The division  of responsibilities
for maintenance,  water allocation  planning  and delivery  between farmers  and the irrigation
agency is made clear to the latter by WUAs. The first group whose members  pay a service fee to
the government,  also benefitted  from an annual legal agreement  that lays out the rights and
obligations  of the two parties in considerable  detail. The process by which the agreement  is
reached  has a fair measure of transparency.  Thus the walkthrough  was an open process that
identified maintenance  needs. The basis of the ISF and exemptions  from the fee and norms  for
water allocation were spelt out in the legal agreement.  The agreements are signed  by district
officials and WUA officials and were treated as contracts  between the two. Nearly 88% of the
sample farmers interviewed  from the first group confirmed  that they were aware of the legal
agreement.
Information  on Water Allocations.  Farmers  in the first two groups  benefitted from
well laid out procedures  that inform them about water rotation  plans and changes  in such plans.
The practice of monthly  meetings between WUA officials  and irrigation  officials was a central
element of the system.  In the dry season, a similar weekly  meeting  was held to review  and
disseminate  information  among  farmers. In Group 1  villages, farmers  were able to compare  their
allocations against the norms  for allocation  given in their legal agreement.  In both groups, the
practice of notices being put up on water rotations at the tertiary  -gate  was in vogue.  In brief,
periodic meetings between irrigation  officials and farmers  and communication  within WuAs
(between  their officials and members)  were the primary means for the dissemination  of
information on water rotation  plans and changes.
-It  is recognized  that recall could be a problem  when  farmers  are asked about experiences  five years back. Case
studies and corroborative  evidence  were used as cross checks.25
Satisfaction It is not easy to assess compliance  without a comprehensive
evaluation  of all the elements discussed  above. Instead of this approach, we have adopted a short
cut method  by using farmer satisfaction  as a means to judge compliance.  An indirect way to
assess the quality of compliance  is by ascertaining  the satisfaction  of farmers with water
allocation planming,  actual allocations  received, and maintenance.  These are the key dimensions
of the service that most concern farmers.  Farmer satisfaction  with them can be expected to reflect
on compliance at least indirectly.  Needless  to say that satisfaction  is a function also of factors
other than compliance.
The results reported in Table I show that farner satisfaction  scores with water
allocation  planning, water allocations  received, and maintenance  have improved  substantially in
the first two groups over a period of four years. Over this period,  WVUAs  had become active in
the two groups and different voice mechanisms  including  ISF were introduced  in the first group.
The improvement  is consistent  across all three dimensions.  More satisfactory  plans, aLocations
and maintenance  as viewed by farmers  cannot normally  coexist with poor compliance  by the
service  provider with the rules of the game.
De:entralizat,ion  and Incentives
While measures  of responsiveness  and compliance  can be used to judge the level
of public accountability,  the sustainability  of a given level of accountability  in an agency will
depend  on whether (1) the responsibility  and authority for problem solving have been delegated
downwards  in its organizational  structure,  (2) resources  have been made available  at lower levels
to respond to voice mechanisms,  and (3) agency staff have the necessary  motivation to be
esponsive to voice. The first two are the pre-requisites  of decentalization and the last concems
the  incentive  structure. The evidence on decentralization  and incentives  can be used to conclude
whether the accountability  we observe  in the present case is a fleeting  phenomenon or one that
might be sustained.
(1) The creation of the irrigation  committee  at the district level (with the presence
of WUA Federations on this committee)  to plan and implement  irrigation activities  including ISF
collection shows that the authority  and responsibility  for important  decisions  have been delegated
downwards. The creation of an ISF Unit in the district head's office and the use of "walkthrough"
as a basis for maintenance  planning and of monthly meetings  at the local level are also evidence
of a decentralized approach.
(2) While budgets are a centralized tool of management  in GOI, the authority
given to the district head to incur maintenance  expenditur in his ISF program implies further
decentralization.  For farmers, this means greater responsiveness  from the agency as speedier
actions  can be taken for maintenance. This is clearly  linked to the fact that the district head
generates  ISF revenues in his area. This reform is a step towards the integration of authority and
responsibility.  The non ISF areas are yet to benefit from this reform.26
(3) In the ISF (Group 1) areas,  20% of the fee collection  is being used to give
incentive  payments  to ISF staff and to defray  WUA costs for ISF collection.  By linking these
incentives  to the size of the ISF collection,  provider  staff have  been encouraged  to be more
responsive  to fanner needs and feedback Here again,  the limitation  is that the scheme  is confined
to the ISF staff.  The incentive  system  now in place  has led service  provider staff  to pay special
attention  to ISP areas and to monitor aspects  of special concern  to ISF such as fee collection.
We summarize  the results of the different  strands of analysis  presented  above  in
the following  table.  A qualitative  assessment  of the directions  and extent of changes in the
different  measures  and manifestations  of accountability  in the post-voice  period are given against
Groups I and 2.27
Table  2
Vociit  eaioRId  nsbip
Measures/manifestations
Responsiveness 
Group  I  Group  2 (ISF  WUAs)  (Non  ISF  WUAs)
-proportion  of farmers 
declining 
declining complaining
-response  time 
declining 
declining













Decentralization  &  Incentives
-delegation  of 
substantial 
partial functions
-staff  incentives 
substantial 
none
It is evident  from  Table  2 that  Group  1 (ISF  villages)  has the  strongest combmation  of voice  mechanisms  ( a mix  of service  related  and  policy  linked  mechanisms).
Group  2 (non-ISF  villages)  comes  next  in terms  of the strength  of voice  mechanisms  (a mix  of28
two service related mechanisms).  This ranking is based solely on the-range  of mechanisms
present and not on their weights which is more difficult to judge. It is possible to argue, for
example, that ISF payment has a greater role in inducing  the decentralization  of agency functions
than tertiary canal maintenance.  Different  voice mechanisms  clearly  influence  accountability  in
different ways. Rating and ranking  them is a complex  exercise and has not been attempted here.
Whether the impact  of voice on accountability  has been positive in the two groups
of villages can be assessed  in two ways. First, the changes  over time in the first two groups (and
after ISF was introduced  in Group 1) can be examined to see whether  they have been positive or
negative for service provider accountability.  Second,  an across the group comparison of the
indicators  of accountability  can be used to judge whether the presence  of ISF and related
mechanisms  in one group was associated  with a higher level of service  provider accountability.
Changs Over  Time
(1) Of the eight indicators reported under responsiveness,  compliance and
decentralization  and incentives,  seven have moved over time in an unambiguously  positive
direction as far as the service provider  accountability  experienced  by Group 1 is concerned.  The
positive changes reported under decentralization  and incentives  imply that the observed
improvement in accountability  is likely to be sustained.  The change  in farmer saisfaction with
response  to complaints  is in the right direction,  but insignificant There is room for disagreement
on the implications of this finding. Our assessment  is that slow progress on this front need not
necessarily  reflect poorly on the state of accountability.
(2) Of the eight indicators of accountability, four have moved unambiguously  in a
positive direction in the experience  of Group 2. Partial progress has been reported on two other
indicators.  No progress has been noticed in the remaining  indicators.  The lack of change in one
t  hem, namely, farmer satisfaction  with response to complaints, can be interpreted the same
way as in (1) above.
Across  fthe  GroupCa  Qon
(1) The findings  reported in Table 2 show  that service  provider accountability  in
both Groups 1 and 2 have improved over time.  An inter-group  comparison  reveals, however, that
accountability  in relation to Group 1 is distinctly  better than that of Group 2, largely due to the
positive changes that seem to have occunred  in the transparency  of process, dissemination  of
information,  satisfaction with compliance, delegation  of agency functions  and agency staff
incentives. Most of these followed the adoption  of ISF in the district under study. On the other
hand 1 the evidence on responsiveness  for the first two groups is not that dissimilar-  While Group
1 shows greater progress over time,  Group 2 has done better in relative terms. A tentative
conclusion is that while ISF seems to have encouraged  compliance  and decentralization,  its
impact on provider responsiveness  remains subdued,  probably because of the natural tendency of
paying members to expect more im  terms of service.29
-(2)  Compared  to Groups  1 and  2, for  the  control  group,  compliance  and
Mcentralaion  were  not  relevant  issues  as tradional  practices  have  continued  as before.  No
,idence  of changes  in dtese  dimensions  were  available.  Taking  all factors  into  account,  we
include  that  service  provider  accountability  improved  for  Groups  I and  2 while  it remained  the
me for the  control  group.
As noted  in Chapter  3, accountability  is a mediating  variable  beiween  voice  and
rvice  outcomes.  It is impotant  therefore  to see  whether  the  change  in accountability  -was
flowed  by improved  service  outcomes  in the  villages  under  study.  Crop  intensity  (CI) data  for
e year  before  WUAs  became  active  and after  a period  of the  years  when-  voice  mhanisms
;I  stabilized  were  collected  for this  pu  . Changes  in CI  for villages  in-  Groups  1 and 2 over
ne  were  then  estimated  and  compared  with  the change  in accountability  over  more  or less  the
.-e period.
Table  3
Group  ,  ,  ,  .. ,,  ,Crop  Intnsity(%)' 2
1989  1993
Group  in - 155.0(255.0)  180.0(265.0)
Group  2-  168.0(268.0)  174.0(274.0)30
The changes  in CI, an efficiency  measure  of service  outcome,  are positive  for both
groups. The per cent changes  are 16 for Group 1 over a four year  period and 4 over a two year period for
Group 2. When CI is worked  out taking  the full year,  the per cent  changes  drop to 4 and 2 respectively
for the two groups.  The districts under  study are among  the most intensively  cultivated  areas with
already high CIs in East Java.  It is not surprising  therefore  that relative  changes  are not more substantial.
Data on the relative position  of the upstream  and downstream  villages  in terms of Ca  were not available
for the years 1989 and 1993  given  in Table 3. Over a two to three year period for which data are
available,  the relative position  of CIs between upstream  and downstream  villages  has not changed  in the
two groups
Judged  by the criterion  of crop intensity,  service  outcomes  have improved  in both groups
over more or less the same period  in which enhanced  accountability  was observed.  The downstream
villages  in the two groups  were able to maintain  their relative  positions,  but did not improve  upon them.
Our overall conclusion  is that enhanced  provider  accountability  was followed  by improved  service
outcomes
in the two groups  of villages.
*  '5The period 1990-91  to 1993-94  was used for Group l. For Group  2, data were available  for the period 1991-
1992-93.31
Chapter 5
Conclusions  and Policy  Implications
There is an emerging  consensus  today that public  accountability  is an important
ingredient  of good governance.  The preceding  chapters  have presented  detailed  empirical
evidence on the influence  of the public ts use of "voice"  on service  provider  accountability.
Contrary to the conventional  view that governments  are the sole authority  to enforce
accountability  in their realm, our evidence  shows  that users  of services  can also influence  the
accountability  of service  providers  through  a variety  of voice mechanisms.  The public's use of
voice can be viewed  as complementing  and reinforcing  the government's  mission  as there are
limits  to the latter's ability to achieve  public accountability  on its own.
The conclusions  and lessons of the study are summarized  below.
1. Irrigation  is a sector  of the economy  that has for long recognized  the role of
voice to facilitate  efficient  water management.  WUAs in some  form or the other exist in this
sector in many countries.  These organizations  bring  farmers  together  to participate  in collective
activities  and thus act as the voice of farmers.  The role of WUAs in improving  project  outcomes,
increasing  farmer self reliance,  and reducing  public  costs (through  cost recovery)  is well known.
Their impact  on service  provider  behavior  and hence on public accountability,  on the other hand,
is much less known.  Project or service  outcomes  improve  in part because of a more accountable
agency  performance.  This study has shown that there is a positive association  between the use of
voice mechanisms  by farmers  through  WUAs and the accountability  of the irrigation  service
provider It shows  that service  outcomes  such as crop intensity  changes come about at least in
part thromuh  the mediating  variable  of improved  accountability.  Collective  activities  by WUAs
such as tertiary  maintenance,  monthly  or weekly  meetings,  1SF  payment,  walkthrough  and
participation  in the district irrigation  committee  act as voice mechanisms  that induce the
irrigation  agency and district  government  to take organizational  actions, share  information  and
monitor  problems  in a way that might not have happened  without  the pressure of voice. It is this
changed agency  behavior  that brings  about a more reliable and possibly  more adequate,  if not
equitable,  supply  of water to meet farmer  needs.  This study is unique  in its focus on the role of
accountability  as the mediating  variable  between voice and service  outcomes.
2. WUAs are rightly  viewed  as the "voice"  of farmers.  But-  unbundling  the
functions  of WUAs in our study makes it clear that voice is not an undifferentiated  phenomenon.
Voice may consist of a range of mechanisms  and their impact  on accountability  need not be
identical.  A useful distinction  can be made between  service  related and policy  linked voice
mechanisms.  The mix of voice mechanisms  available  to a WUA seems  to have an impact  on the
level and substainability  of an agency's  accountability.  The Group 1 villages  which had a wider
range of both service  related and policy  linked voice mechanisms  seem to have induced a higher32
level of provider accountability.  The decentralization  of agency functions  and improved  staff
incentives  that accompanied  ISF can be interpreted  as creating  the conditions  for more sustained
agency  accountability.  Some  mechanisms  like the walkthrough  can have a broader  policy impact
(through  the maintenance  budget)  than is often realized.  The conclusion  here is that the nature
and potential  impact  of voice mechanisms  can vary and that hence the choice of appropriate
mechanisms  in a given context does matter.
3. While accountability  is a nebulous  concept,  the study has shown that a useful
way to define and assess  changes  in it in a sector  context is through  measures  of change in
agency responsiveness,  compliance  with the rules of the game and organizational  structure  and
incentives.  Decentralization  which implies a change  in the agency  structure  is sometimes  quoted
as evidence of accountability.  While decentralization  is an important  dimension,  whether  agency
behavior  conforms  to what might be expected  from a decentralized  strucure can be judged only
by seeking evidence  on the actual behavior  of the agency.  Measures  of responsiveness  and
compliance  provide  such evidence  thomugh  the information  on the extent  of complaints,
transparency  of process,  etc. One is not a substitute  for the other. Measures  of responsiveness,
compliance  and structure  and incentives  complement  one another.
4. Measuring  changes in responsiveness  may  sometimes  produce  unexpected
results. Data on the volume  of complaints  and response  time,  for example,  can be obtained  in
reasonably  objective  terms from farmers  or the service  provider.  But assessing  farmer satisfaction
with the resolution  of complaints  can be complex.  This is because the expectations  of farmers  (or
the public) can change as a result of using voice.  Farmers  may use stricter standards  or show  less
tolerance  of agency  inefficiencies  when they  are better  informed  and work in a contract  mode.
There is an interaction  effect here that needs  to be taken into account  in interpreting  the meaning
of the results on farmer satisfaction.  While some  quantification  and standardization  of data are
possible  in assessing  accountability,  it is important  th  the findings  are interpreted  with care and
due attention  to the processes  at work
Policpy =lkications
The findings  of this study  have important  policy  implications  for govemments  and
donors  concerned  about the accountability  and  performance  of public  service  agencies  in the
developing  world. Although  our analysis  was confined  to the irrigation  sector,  the significance
and relevance of the conclusions  cut across  sectors.  The major policy  implications  of the study
are the following:
1. The evidence  from hdonesia!s irrigation  sector  shows that  where exit is not a
realistic option for people,  the accountability  of public  service  providers  can be improved
through  the use of voice  by their customers.  Improved  accountability  in turm  seems  to contribute
to better service  outcomes.  Simil.^r  research on the role of voice and accountability  in other
sectors needs to be undertaken  before broader  generalizations  can be made across  a wide range of-33
iblic  services.  Public  policies  in support  of voice  and ccountability  should  be informed  by the
ridings  of such  studies.
2. There  is a-  wide  range  of voice  mechanisms  that  can  be used  by citizens'  to
iprove  the  accountability  of public  service  providers.  Most  of them  entail  the  participation  of
.ople  in some  or the  other.  But there  can  be voice  mechanisms  (such  as ISP)  that  are not
rticipatory  in the conventional  sense. Governments  and their  public  service agencies  need to
:amine  and  identify  the  ldnd  of mechanisms  most  appropriate  to a service  and  the context  in
bich  they are to be applied.  Understandig  the  nane  of the service  and  the characteristics  and
ior experiece of its users  are the first  steps  in the  process  of choosing  and  desigg  voice
echanisms.  In the Indonesian  case,  farmers  already  had  some  experience  with  collective  action
irrigation.  This  no doubt  was  a reason  why  they  could  combine  both  service  related  and policy
iked  voice  mechanisms.  In a different  context,  this  combination  may  not have  been  sustained.
u-ticipation  in the irrigation  committee  and  in walkthroughs  and  the use  of  -the-  legal  agreement,
r example,  call  for greater  skills  and sophistication-  on the part  of farmers  than  is required  for
e-tings  at the  village  level  for tertiary  canal-  mainance.  Those  who  design  and  choose  such
echanisms  ned to be sensitive  to the learmng  process  at work  in h  sector  and  to the public's
ility  and willingness  to use tLe  diffent  voice  mechams.
3. While  a service  fee  is often  perceived  as a mes  to generate  revenues,  it has
.added  advantage  that  it can make  users  more  vigilant  and  encourage  -them  to demand
countability  from  the service  provider.  User  fees  can thus  act as a  reinforcement  to the
ivernmens  traditional  accountability  mechanis.  By the same  token,  a govemrment  that
ogressively  intoduces  user  fees  for its public  servces (instead  of giving  them  free  or taxing
izens) should  note that the public  -may  increasingly-  tend to seek  impved  service  and
countability  from its service  providers  when  -it  pays  for the service.
4. Improved  acountabilit may  ite  some  measure  of decenhrlization  in
-. public  agencies  involved.  The sustainability  of  contablebehavior  requires  tacerhat  an
geanizaional  functions  are delegated  to  the  local  level  where  speedy  responses  to user  problems
n be made.  It also  requires  that  resources  (in terms  of a budget,  incentives  and  manpower)-  are
ailable-at  that  level.  Failure  to take hese  steps  while  encoucaging  the  public  to use voice  may
ult  - incaeased  public  fustation. Support  to voice  mechanisms  at the local  level  therefore
eds  to be matched  -by  policy  makers  tkng  the necessary  actions  towards  decenralizaton,
dgetary  flexibility  and  the creation  of staff  incentives.
dZ  A  ^9  :-;#n.^1:.:  ,"A:  ^34
seldom be made known to the citizens. Legal provisions  do not necessarily  mean that their
implementation  occurs as intended.  Nevertheless,  appropriate  changes in their governing
legislation that requires service providers to state their norms and standards of service and to
make them widely  known to the public can be a useful step towards improving  public
accountability.35
Annex I
Exit Voice and Control
The prevailing  concepts  and practices  of public  accountability  can be traced  to a
wide range of developments  in economics,  political  science,  public  administration  and law.
Public finance and, in particular,  developments  in cost-benefit  analysis  and performance
measurement  have had a major impact  on the information  being sought  for public accountability
at the macro and micro level (Feldstein  85; Premchand  83; Bos 86). Recent developments  in
public choice theory and the New Institutional  Economics  (NEE)  are also germane  to the issue of
public accountability.
Public choice  theory does not consider  th e state and its agents as neutral
bystanders  in group interaction. This has given rise to the positive theory of rent seeking which
is concerned  with the means used by interest groups  in getting what they want (Buchanan,  et al.
80; Bruenan and Buchanan  85; Hardin 82; Olsen 85). Given the bureaucracy's  rent seeking
tendency,  the theory tends to support the case for limiting  the role of the state and reducing  the
size of the bureaucracy. A branch  of public choice theory,  the collective  action literature,
specifies  the conditions  under which groups  of people  tend to get organized  to ensure the
accountability  of public  service  providers. NIE, on the other hand,  focuses on the role of
transaction costs, contracts  and incentives  as the route to greater accountability  and performance
(Williamson  85; Bardhan 89; Colander  84). The approach  here is to enhance  accountability  by
solving the principal-agent  problem. Implicit  here is the assumption  that incentives  can be
designed to make hierarchical  control  work. Much of this work is concerned  with the behavior
of the firm  Whether  the approach  to the resolution  of the agency  problem proposed  in the NIE is
relevant  to public services  is not entirely  clear. Those  who work in this field do recognize  that
problems  of incentives  and governance  are enormously  difficult  in the political  or public sector
context (Williamson  85).
The NIE approach  will be valid, however,  only when the problem of principal-
agent relations within public  agencies  can be readily solved. When multiple principals  with
conflicting  objectives  exist (political  actors, the public and  bureaucratic  supervisors  in this case)
and market imperfections  and opportunism  prevail (information  asymmetries,  monopoly
conditions),  scope for collusion  increases,  and the agency  problem remains unsolved  (Tirole 87;
Levy 87; Fama and Jensen 83; Galal 89). Under  these conditions,  it cannot  be assumed  that an
accountability  system based on hierarchical  control (HC)  will serve the interests of all relevant
stakeholders. Alternatively,  HC might approximate  true public  accountability  for some  time
(e.g.,  with good leaders or after a public  revolt),  but might not be sustained. This is consistent
with the finding of other  observers  that the neglected  element  in  accountability  is the public's
viewpoint. The directional  change  required in the reform  of accountability  systems for public
services  lies in integrating  this element into the hierarchical  control  approach.36
Determinants  of Accountability
Viewed  from the standpoint  of the public, there are two basic determinants  of
accountability. One is the extent  to which  the public  has access to alternative  suppliers,  public or
service,  of a given service. The question  here  is whether  there is potential  or scope for the public
to gil.  The second  is the degree  to which  they  can influence  the final outcome  of a service
through  some form of participation  or articulation  of protest  irrespective  of whether  the ex:c
option exists. In other  words, can they  exert their  voice in order  to ensure accountability?  Exit
and voice are terms that Albert Hirschman  made popular  in his excellent  discussion  of the ways
in which consumers  cope with the problem  of performance  deterioration  in the production  of
goods and services (firschman 70).6 He treats  exit as an economic  response  mechanism  and
voice as a  olitical  response  mechanism.  The former  is ubiquitous  in the competitive  market
place  whereas  the latter is found more often  in organizations  such as political  parties and
voluntary  agencies. Exit and voice options  can be both substitutes  and  complements  to each
other  depending  on certain  underlying  conditions  which Hirschman  develops  in his book. He
further  notes  that the cost of voice could  be higher than that of exit in view of the need for
collective  action  and the risk of the less  certain  outcomes  of voice.
The conceptual  framework  presented  below builds on Hirschman's  concept  of exit
and voice,  but with special reference  to public  services. Two interrelated  questions  will be
explored  here. Under  what conditions  are the exit and voice options  likely to be effective  in
enhancing  accountability  in public services? How and why do public  services  differ in their
amenability  to the use of exit and voice as a means  to improve their  performance? Answers  to
these questions  are essential  for designing  better approaches  to public  service  accountability.
Diagram  I below provides  a simple,  but generalized  answer  to the first question.
The public's  decision to use exit, voice or a combination  of both will depend  on two factors,
namely,  the expected  retums  resulting  from improved  accountability  (e.g.,  better quality,
reduction  in delays and corruption,  responsiveness  or other attributes  that the public value,  etc.),
and the costs associated  with the use of exit and voice. For the individual,  exit costs will consist
of transaction  costs for the most part. These are the costs of acquiring,  processing  and evaluating
the information  about alternative  suppliers  of the service  in question  (e.g.,  evaluation  of health
care altematives). To the extent that the locations  of providers  vary,  incremental  transport  costs
may have to be taken into account  (e.g.,  in the choice  of schools,  transport  is a relevant  cost).
Voice will entail not only transaction  costs,  but also the costs incurred  by the individual  for
collective  action where  it becomes  necessary.  When the public (users  of services)  create formal
organizations  for this purpose,  individuals  will be called upon to meet both fixed costs and
'  While  Hirschman  recognizes  the relevance  of these  options  to both  private  and public  sectors,  he focusses
almost  exclusively  on the world  of private  goods  where  both  options  are  readily  available.  Furthermore,  he does
not  examine  the issue  of the relevance  and design  of varying  institutional  devices  or arrangements  for facilitating  the
use of exit  and voice  in varying  contexts  and the conditions  under  which  they will be optimal.37
recurrent  operating  costs  (e.g., water  users  groups  which  will  incur initial  set Up  costs 11s  well  as
annual  operating  costs). The  relative  cosis  of exit and  voice  and their  levels  may  vary  depending
on the  degree  of market.  failure  affecting  the  services."7  Market  failure  here  is treated  as external
to the scrvice  provider  and is caused  by cxternalities,  decreasing  costs  (e.g.,  natural  monopoly)
and informational  asymmetries.  In Diagram  1,  costs  and rcturns  are measured  vertically  whiie
public  services  are ranked  horizontally  according  to the increasing  intensity  of market  failure."
Assume  that  the public  is willing  to use  exit  and voice  in order  to improve  public
accountability.  AB  represents  the cost  of exit  associated  with  each  of the serv  ices  on the
horizonal  axis  and incurred  by an individual  (a member  of the  public). CD  is the cost  of voice
estimated  on 'a  similar  basis. Although  the cost  of voice  is often  incurTed  in a group,  cach  point
on the curve  could  be treated  as the individual's  cost  of voice. As  expected,  for  the public,  voice
costs  more  than  exit for the  range  of services  facing  competition,  but as market  failure  increases,
exit becomes  more  costly  than  voice. The  cost  of exit is  clearly  more  sensitive  to market  failure
than  the cost  of voice. For  example,  the  cost  of creating  an alternative  (exit)  in the fauc  of a
natural  monopoly  will  be enonnous.  The  cost  of  organizing  the  public  to seek  changes  from  the
monopoly  (voice)  will  also  be substantial,  but not  as high  as the former. But  even  the cost  of
voice  tends  to go up as the monopoly  and  information  asymmetries  associated  with  market
failure  increases  along  the Y axis. Diagram  I shows  that  the public  services  within  the range  of
OK will  find  the use of  exit more  efficient  for  improving  accountability  whereas  the services  to
the right  of K will  find  voice  more  efficient.  When  city transport  services  permit  both  public  and
private  options,  the  public  will  tend  to use  exit,  while  faced with  urban  water  supply  problems
the public  is more  likely  to resort  to voice.
Diagram  II introduces  the concept  of the expected  value  or returns  from
performance  improvement  to the public  that improved  accountability  can bring about. EF
represents the expected returns to the individual  of such performance  improvement. Its declining
slope  signifies  the increasing  difficulty  in improving  accountability  as market  failure  increases.
A monopoly,  for  example,  is expected  to be less  responsive  to public  pressure.  Upward  shift  in
the expected returns curve  can occur, lhowever,  when supervision  or incentives  are strengthened
to make the service provider  more responsive.' 9
"  The level of voice  costs  will be affected  also  by the prevailing  socio-political  environment.  For example,  a
free press, dissemination  of information,  legal rights,  etc.  will reduce  costs  for the individual.
"  Note that services here differ only  in respect of the degree or Uiarket  failure. Strictly speaking,  only one type
of market  failure should  be considered  at a time  along the Y axis (e.g., nalural  monopoly). Needless  to say, these  are
highly  restrictive  assumptions.
"  Returns  are the monetary  equivalent  of the gains  from improved  accountability  that the individual  receives  as a
result of the use  of exit  or voice. The upward  shift is treated  here as an autonomous  step,  but need not always  be so.38
Given the exit and voice cost curves, Diagram  IH  shows  that the combinations  of
exit and voice that are efficient for different  goods will vary depending  on the level and slope of
the expected return curves. Thus when EF applies,  both exit and voice yield net returns along the
range of OKI.- Nevertheless,  exit is clearly  the more efficient  option. Within the KIMI range of
services, voice is the superior  option though up to M, exit continues  to yield net returns. For
services beyond OLI, neither  exit nor voice seem efficient solutions  though an upward  shift in
the returns curve can reduce  their number. Public services  can thus be partitioned  into three
categories by reference  to the net returns to performance  improvement  generated  by the use of
exit and voice.
Four propositions  can be assumed  to flow from this simple diagrammnatic
presentation. (1) Exit is more efficient,  and hence more likely  to be used by the public in
services least affected by market  failure whereas voice is relatively  more efficient as market
failure increases. (2) For many services,  either option or a combination  of the two wil still leave
some net returns and therefore the choice may depend also on the preferences  of the public for
different combinations. (3) The level of expected  retums has a direct bearing on the extent to
which voice will be deployed  especially in the range of services  facing increasing  market failure.
In other words, the public  is likely to use voice only when the gross  benefits of voice are
expected to exceed its costs. (4) There are some public  services  for which the use of neither exit
nor voice mechanisms  will be efficient,  though an upward shift in the returns curve can reduce
their number. Net returns  here are negative. These are the services most effected  by market
failure.
Exit-Voice Combinations
We shall now move on to the second  question  of the factors that influence  the
potential  for exit and voice in the context of different  types of public services.Y This will take us
beyond the foregoing  aggregative  approach  which considered  services  solely as a function of
market failure and of the public as an undifferentiated  lot  For example, monopoly  conditions
may be caused by natural factors or by policy design. The public  need not be homogeneous  and
may vary in its capacity to use voice. Further disaggregation  of these factors  will provide a
useful basis for classifying  public services in terms of the barriers and characteristics  that affect
the relevant public's potential  for exit and voice.
The factors that influence  the potential  for exit and voice in the context of
different  public services can be summarized  as follows: The key characteristics  on the exit side
are the presence of (a) economies  of scale (natural  monopoly),  (b) legal barriers  to entry, and (c)
spatial barriers to exit. The influence  of the first two are self evident. The third, spatial barriers,
deserve a brief explanation  as they may be unique  to certain locationslregions. For a poor
isolated village, for example, there can be only one local school. Spatial barriers will prevent the
villagers  from sending children  to the next school  which may be miles away.
1  For a fuller discussion  of this question,  see Paul (1990).39
Voice potential  is determined  by (a) informational  barriers; (b) legal and
institutional barriers; (c) the public's level of income and education (and hence political power)
(d) the relative importance  of the service to the public;  and (e) the scope for product (service)
differentiation. Many govemments  tend to limit the information  available to the public. Lack of
modem technologies (e.g.,  poor telecommnunications)  can further restrict access to information.
Legal barriers emerge when the political system in a country  does not permit free expression  or
collective action. Income and education  have a direct bearing on the public's capacity to exert
voice and bear its costs. Furthermore,  the people  are likely to invest in voice when services
matter a great deal to them (high product involvement). In some  cases where services cannot be
differentiated, the weak may gain from the strong (positive  externalities)  who are motivated to
use voice in spite of the free rider problenL Drinking water, an undifferentiated  good, illustrates
this characteristic.
Some of these barriers and characteristics  are natural whereas others are policy
induced or political in nature. Economies of scale, spatial bafriers, the relative importance  of
services, and product differentiation  are natural factors. Some  of the policy-induced  factors may
originate in political discrimination  or denial of rights, e.g., low income or education and some
legal barriers. In general,  political  barriers are reflected  in policy-induced  factors. Legal,
information and institutional barriers, and income and education  characteristics  (to a large
extent), are thus policy-induced  factors. Public services  can be categorized  in terms of the exit
and voice potential they afford the public  by reference to these barriers or characteristics.
Diagram  Im shows how different  sets of bariers/characteristics operate with varying
combinations of exit and voice. Services that illustrate  these combinations are found in Diagram
IV.40
D  IAGRAM  m
Characteristics  of Services/Publics
Voice
Weak  Strong
- high spatial barriers  - large economies of scale
- local monopoly  - high legal barriers to
entry
- 1I  Voice  ~~~~~~~Voice
- low differentiability  - low differentiability
of services  of services
- high income  barriers  - low income barriers
- high legal/institutional  - low or moderate
barriers  information  barriers
- high information barriers
- legal bafflers to entry  - low to moderate economies
- low economies to scale  of scale
- high differentiability  - high differentiability
of services  of services
- high income barriers  - low income barriers
- high legal/mstitutional  - high product involvement
barriers
- high information barriers41
DIAGRAM  IY
Voice
- nual primary education  - urban water supply
- rua  health  - Electricity
-law and order (for the poor)  - regulatory  services
n-  imgation  (large  scale)
-urban low income housing  - urban  transport
-urban primary  education  - university  education
(low  income)  - specialist  health  care
- welfare/nutrition  services
The mix  of  barriers and  characteristics  in the four  cells of Diagram  m  can be used  u
predict  the degree  of exit and voice  that different  public  services  can have. -Wa  is require
analysis of the services  in ums  of these characLeristics/  barriers and the extent  to which  the
natural  or policy  induced.  -There are, however,  some services  which-  are similar  in nature
between  certain  cells. This is because  when provided  to different  types of population  the sa
service  can be charactized  by differing  degrees  of exit or voice potential. For example,  pi
education  is found in both  Cels  1 and 3 of Diagram  IV. Nevertheless,  firom  the standpoint
accountability,  this seeming  overlap does  not imply a duplication. Contextual  features  and
attributes  of the public  need not be the same even for identical  services.
--  Wha options  are available  to improve  public accountability  for the services
four cells disc  above? This question  can best be answered  by viewing  the featr  of c
-service  against  the constraints  and opporunities (potential)  for exit and voice being  faced b
relevant  publics. Options  here  refer to alterative remedies  or solutions  to the problem  of42
is in these  three cells with Cells I and 3 deservming  priorty attention. Third, the serch process
should  first explore the scope  for eliminating  policy  induced  barriers  and characteristics  as a
means  to improve  accountability.  Natural  barriers  or featres  are more difficult  to deal with.
Hence  the payoff from the latter wiU  be smaller  and the time taken  to achieve  improvements  wi
be longer.
A suggestive  menu  of options  for improving  accountait  rough the use of ex
and voice mechanisms  is offered  in Diagram  V. The specific  choices  to be made will depend  ox
the exit-voice  potential  combination  that exists in a given context. To illustrate,  the public in
Cell I whose  -exit  and voice  potential  is low, faces the exit barriers  are natural  wbereas  most of
their  voice itarriers  are policy-induced.  Accountability  can be achieved  not through exit, but
through  the use of voice aided  by exteral  intervention  (e.g.,  NGOs  or public evaluation). For
the public in Cell 2 who have strong voice, mechansms such as public hearings, and
participation  in decision  bodies  can help improve  accountability.  This group may  well deploy
voice  mechanisms  on their own  rather  than depend  on exteral  support  or initiative. Those  in




vouchers  ard grants  participation  in  decision  making
contracting  out  boards,  referenda
(incl. mgt.  contracts,  leasing)  local  governments
public competiion  public  hearings/panels
self help  community  organizations
deregulation  media  forums/interventions
privatization  public  surveys/evaluation
migration  ombudsmen
technological  options  emal  organizations  (NGOs)
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Diagram  V shows  that exit/voice  mechanisms do not influence  accountability  in
isolation. They interact with the monitoring  and incentive  systems of service providers. The
thrust of monitoring,  for example, may shift more towards quality attributes  (reflectir'g public
concems) as a result of voice. Incentives  may be introduced  to motivate  service-provider  staff to
achieve  quality in the face of exit/voice. If the behavior  of service providers does not change,
further use of exit or use of other voice mechanisms  may follow. Exit, voice,  and HC thus
determine accountability  in an interactive  mode.
Will the use of exit and voice mechanisms  result in the improvement of public
accountability? A positive  -answer  to this question will depend on two conditions. First, the use
of exit and voice should be consistent with the characteristics  of the services and the publics
involved. An analysis of the features and barriers of public services  and of the publics involved
can be used to predict the potential  for the use of exit and voice in specific  service contexts. This
analysis along with the knowledge  of the extent  to which the featurestbarriers  are natural or
policy induced provide a basis for the design of new mechanisms  for public accountability  and
improved  service performance. The following  propositions specify  the conditions  under which
accountability  will be improved through  the use of exit and voice.
Second, exit and voice should cause the behavior of the public service provider to
change. Since HC is the instrument  for achieving  behavioral  changes in the service provider, the
condition to be met is that its monitoring  and incentive  systems are adapted in response  to exit
and voice. This is important  because if HC has not been adapted,  the public service provider's
behavior is unlikely  to be affected and exit and voice would not have had their desired impact on
accountability. With the use of exit, for example, some segments  of the public may benefit by
moving to private providers. The public service  provider may still remain as inefficient  and
ineffective as before if he does not get the right signals through an adapted  HC. A measure of the
adaptation  is the extent to which monitoring  by the provider spans efficiency, access and quality
instead of being limited to inputs and compliance  with  -internal  rules. When such monitoring  is
reinforced  by appropriate  incentives to the provider,  HC can be said to have adapted to exit and
voice. If an adaptive response  does not follow, exit and voice mechanisms  may be further
modified  so as to give stronger signals to the provider. When mutual consistency  between HC,
exit and voice is achieved,  the second  condition for improving  public accountability  is satisfied.44
Annex2
Water User Associations:  The Sample
While many aspects  of WUAs have been researched,  very little is known about
their impact on the accountability  of the public  agencies  with which  farmers interface.  Needless
to say that if farmers have full control over all aspects of water management,  this is a non-issue.
In reality,  this is seldom  the case as irrigation  systems are planned and managed  by public
irrigation agencies  or public works departments  in most developing  countries. Often primary and
secondary  canals are built and maintained  and water flows controlled  by these agencies in
developing  countries. They may levy irrigation  fees on farmers and may use the proceeds or other
funds to maintain  and manage  the irrigation  system.  Under conditions  that necessitate a sharing
of functions  and responsibilities  between public agencies  and farmers, the issue of the
accountability  of the service  provider to farmers assumes  special importance.  The question is
whether the voice effect of WUAs can make a significant  difference  to the accountability  of the
public agencies involved.
The influence  of WUAs on the behavior  of public service  providers is the subject
of the first hypothesis  tested in this study. Case studies of the working of WUAs and of water
management  by farmers where WUAs were inactive were prepared  for aUl  the twelve  sample
villages  included in the study.  Four of the twelve studies pertained  to active WUAs whose
members paid irrigation service  fees (ISF) to the government.  A second set of four studies
pertained to WUAs that were active, but whose members  were not required by government  to
pay ISF. The third set consisted  of studies of four villages  with relatively  inactive or no WUAs
and without ISF. In terms of voice, the first set (ISF WUAs) can be expected  to have the
strongest voice mechanisms/practices.  The second set (non-ISF  WUAs) is the next in order of the
strength of voice. The third set (non-active  WUAs)  is hypothesized  to be the weakest in terms of
voice.
Background  Data on the Selected  Villages
Farmer cooperation  for water management  has been a feature of village  life in
many parts of East Java. Starting in 1968,  the Government  of Indonesia  (GOI) began to
encourage  the formation of farmner  groups all over the country  as part of its mass guidance
program (BIMAS) to increase rice production.  Government  officials  played an active role during
this period in working together with numerous  farmer groups.  The latter typically  worked with
traditional  village officials who  were responsible  for water distribution  from irrigation  canals.
The BIMAS program is reputed to have been a successful  national  endeavor,  having contributed
to the achievement  of self sufficiency  in rice for the country as a whole.
In 1982 and 1984,  GOI issued  executive orders  requiring  farmers to establish
formal water user associations  (WUAs) in villages to work with service  provider agencies
serving agriculture.  In most cases, the informal  farmer groups  got transformed  into WUAs with45
the traditional  village officials  being elected to lead them. In villages  where farmer groups  were
not strong, this transformation  may have occurred  in name only or not at all. Our sample villages
illustrate  this point well. The first two sets of villages  offer examples of formal  WUAs that were
created out of existing farmer groups.  The third set consisted of villages where such
transformation  had not taken place. In two of the four villages,  farmer groups were called WUAs.
In reality, they were inactive and hence were nominal  WUAs only. In the remaining two villages,
even the farmer groups  did not seem to function well.
The four villages  in the ISF WUA sample were Banaran Kulon, Sidokare,
Mungkung, and Mojorembun  in Nganjuk district.  They were served by the Ngudikan irrigation
System,.  originally  developed  by the Dutch to serve sugar factories and sugar cane farmers. This
system and its canals were rehabilitated  in 1987.  WUAs in these villages  were activated
subsequent  to the rehabilitation.  Nganjuk was selected for inclusion of the ISF pilot project of
GOI partly because it had a rehabilitated  irrigation  system and functioning  WUAs. Of the four
villages, Mojorembun  had the most downstream  location. Farmer  members in the four villages
ranged from 267 to 700. The typical cycle  in a year involved  two crops of rice followed by a
secondary  crop that required less water. The most commonly  cultivated crops were rice, maize,
soy bean and sugar cane. Some farmers were reported to have gone for shorter crops such as
onions and vegetables after the third crop, thus getting  four crop seasons. For farmers, moving
from three to four crop seasons meant the fullest utilization  of cultivable land.
The four villages in the non ISF  WUA sample  were selected from the northern
part of Kediri district (adjacent  to Nganjuk) which was served by the Pohblembem  Irrigation
System. This system was also rehabilitated  in 1986-87.  The four villages were Kuwik, Tengger
Lor, Belor, and Mojokerep.  The last village had the most downstream  location.  Membership of
the WUAs in the villages ranged  from 125  to 200. The crops cultivated by the farmers were the
same as in the ISF WUA villages.
The four non-active  WUAs/villages  were located  in East Kediri district and were
served by the Konto and Srikaton Irrigation System.  The villages  were Kemiri, Karang Tengah,
Krecek, and Tunglur. The irrigation  system was rehabilitated  partly in the early 1980s and partly
in 1991.  WUA membership  here did not mean much as they were nominal organizations.  Their
crops were similar to those in other sample villages  except for Jute which was cultivated in two
of the four villages.46
Annex 3
Service-ProviderFunctions
Within GOI, the Ministry  of Public Works (PW) is responsible  for the planning,
management  and delivery of irrigation  services  throughout Indonesia.  PW has offices at the
provincial,  district and sub- district  levels. As the provincial  and local governments  come under
the Ministry of Home Affairs (HA),  the district head (Bupati)  and the village head also play an
active role in the oversight  of irrigation  services.  Thus both PW and HA are jointly responsible
for the management  of irrigation  at the local level. This joint responsibility  is reflected in the
administrative  mechanisms  that exist at the district level and below to oversee  irrigation.
The  igation Commiltte (Bamus)  at the district level is the primary mechanism
to coordinate and monitor irrigation  activities.  A detailed description  of its functions  are given in
Chapter  4.
Monitoring  In ISF areas, the chief of PW and the district head (Bupati) monitor
the following  the planted area, the harvested  area, the cropping  pattern, actual water delivery,
ISF collection,  ISF budget and actual expenditure.  In non-ISF  areas, the focus of monitoring is on
the cropping pattern,  planted and harvested areas,  and actual water delivery  to the WUAs. At the
village level, the monitoring  and record keeping are done by the Juru on irrigation  related
matters.  At the sub-district  level,  the Camat (sub-district  head) monitors ISF collection.  The
Bupati holds a monthly review meeting  of the Camats in his district to monitor the progress and
problems  of the ISF program.
Maintenance PW is responsible  for the maintenance  of the primary and secondary
canals of the irrigation  system while the WUAs are responsible for the maintenance  of the
tertiary canals. The legal agreement  signed by PW officials  and the WUA Federation  officials
annually provides details of the maintenance  to be undertaken  by PW out of the ISF fund. The
"waikthrough"  described  in the preceding  chapter is the basis for the maintenance  program. The
legal agreement and the PW obligations  for maintenance  apply  only to the WUAs in the ISF
areas. Maintenance in the non-ISF  areas are caried out by PW from its provincial  budget
allocations as there is no separate  fund or fee collection  for this purpose.  WUAs may informally
report to PW on the condition of canals and maintenance  needs. PW officials  may take these into
account  in planning their maintenance  program  for the irrigation  system involved.
Decentralization The composition,  location and responsibilities  of the Irrigation
Committee show that detailed  plans for the irrigation  service and their implementation  are under
the control of the local authorities  to a large extent. The overall policies (decrees),  regulations
and rules are provided by the central  ministries through  the provincial government.  The approach
to water allocation planning  and distribution  described  in the preceding  chapter confirm that
operational  decisions are left to local officials  and to the WUAs.  At the district  level, the
Irigation Committee over which the Bupati presides  directs and oversees these activities though47
in technical matters PW has operational  authority  and responsibility.  The Bupati has an ISF Unit
in his office to assist in planning  and monitoring  ISF related activities.  The crucial test of
decentralization  lies, however, in the level at which decisions  can be made pertaining  to
expenditurc.  The maintenance  budget  is the key instrument  in this context. For ISF areas, the
Bupati can authorize maintenance  expenditures  out of the ISF budget in his district. For non-ISF
areas  ' he has no such power. The chief of PW in the district must get approval  from his
provincial chief before maintenance  expenditures  can be incurred  for non-ISF areas, This means
that there was substantial decentralization  in the management  of the ISF program.
The maintenance  of primary and secondary  canals and ISF collection are also
planned at the local level. The walkthrough  is jointly done by local PW officials and WUA
Federation  Officials. ISF collection at the village  level is to be done by each WUA. The proceeds
are to be deposited in a bank in favor of the Treasury. Sanctions  are imposed on defaulting  WUA
members  by local officials. A Bupati who succeeds  in increasing  his ISF collection will have
more resources at his disposal.
Incentives Members  of WUAs in ISF areas are required to pay an extra 20%
along with the irrigation service fee to defray the cost of ISF administration.  Apart from the cost
of printing and distribution of notices, a major part of this amount is used to make incentive
payments to the ISF staff at the district level. Staff receive extra payments  in proportion to the fee
collection achieved during the year. It was not possible to get information  on who exactly are
covered by this incentive scheme and  the criteria used to reward different  categories of staff. One
fourth of the incentive fund is set aside to compensate  the WUAs for their part in the ISF
collection.
Technical Assistance The irrigation  agency provides technical advice and training -
to WlUAs  in respect of registration of land for members,  record keeping for various official
purposes and for liaising with different agencies  in the field. District and sub-district  offices are
also involved in training WUA staff. For ISF areas, a community  organizer  is assigned to a set of
villages as there are a number of ISF related  activities with which WUAs need to become
familiar. In Nganjuk, this service has been provided through a consultancy firm with expertise in
irrigation  management.  In non-ISF  areas also, technical advice and training are provided by the
district level agencies, but without field support from external community organizers or
consultants.
There are clearly  some differences  in the way government  agencies (service
providers)  deal with and support WUAs in ISF and non-ISF  areas. The major differential  features
are the following:
1.  A written legal agreement lays out the responsibilities  and obligations  of
service providers and WUAs in the ISF areas while an infomial understanding  takes its place in
the non-ISF areas. The rationale  is that a service fee is being levied on farmers in ISF areas,.
necessitating an explanation of the basis of the fee and the services farmers could expect in48
return. In non-ISF areas,  WUAs collect membership  charges,  but do not pay a service  fee to the
government agencies for their services.
2. Maintenance  planning  in ISF areas is based on participatory  methods such as
the "walkthrough"  jointly carried out by PW and WUAs.  The need for this open and participatory
approach arises from the fact that the legal agreement  has to be specific and transparent  about the
mutual  obligations of farmers and service providers.  There is no such compelling  factor at work
in non-ISF  areas. In fact, where WUAs are inactive  or farners are not organized,  service
providers may not even feel the need  to discuss maintenance  with farmers, let alone carry out
exercises of this kind.
3. The Bupati plays an oversight  role with regard to both ISF amd  non-ISF areas
through the Irrigation Committee.  The creation of an ISF Unit in his office shows, however, that
greater attention is being paid to the planning  and monitoring  of the ISF program at the district
level. A major responsibility  of the Irigation Committee  is with regard to ISF collection and the
use of this fund. Since the Bupati has discretion in the use of this fund and the legal agreement
lays out his obligations,  he and his PW officials-are  likely to pay more attention  to the
maintenance  priorities of ISF area canals than to those of ffie non-ISF  area canals.
4. The incentive  payments being given to the district level ISF staff are another
differential feature. There is no such comparable  incentive  built into the management  of non-ISF
activities in districts.  Active WUAs can certainly demand  better services by puffing  pressure on
service providers. If WUPAs  are inactive, even this type of pressure will be absent The financial
incentives found in ISF areas probably could act as a further  reinforcement  to the district level
priorities in favor of ISF.
5. There is no evidence to show  that in respect of other agricultural  services such
as extension, fertilizers  and other inputs and training, a significant-  difference exists  between ISF
and non-ISF areas. The provision  of community organizers  in ISF villages  is, however, a special
feature. It represents an extra input by the service provider  to better equip 1SF  WUAs to perform
their new activities (eg., registration,  walkthrough,  record keeping,  etc).
Service Providers  and Inactive WUAs In the four sample villages  with inactive
WUAs, there was not much evidence of active interactions  between service provider staff and
farmer  groups. In principle,  irrigation  service  arrangements  should be the same in all non-ISF
areas. But the evidence from the field shows that farmers  in these villages either dealt with a
traditional village official  or paid a local irrigation  official  to get water released  to meet their
needs. In the absence of active and well organized  water user groups,  service providers may have
had less pressure (demand)  on them to train, inform  and equip farmers to make use of their
services. Officials  have reported that it was more difficult  to work with farmers in the sample
villages in view of the difficulties  in communication  and the prevalence of water theft and other
arbitrary actions caused  in turn by the absence of an organizational  focal point and common
norms of conduct.49
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